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International Taxation and the
Location of Inventive Activity
James R. Hines Jr. and Adam B. Jaﬀe
8.1 Introduction
Tax systems often encourage certain activities at the expense of others.
Governments typically oﬀer very attractive tax treatment to investments
in research and development (R&D), because R&D is thought to be as-
sociated with large positive economic spillovers.1 One of the factors con-
tributing to the generosity of tax beneﬁts for R&D is competition among
governments to attract R&D-intensive investments by multinational cor-
porations (MNCs). Because an MNC typically has the option of per-
forming its R&D in any of several countries, the volume of its R&D
activity in one country is likely to be aﬀected by the attractiveness of op-
portunities elsewhere. In spite of the frequency with which R&D receives
generous tax subsidies, and the widespread belief that these subsidies en-
courage the discovery and development of new technologies, very little
of a quantitative nature is known about the impact of tax rules on the
international location of innovative activity.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the eﬀect of taxation on the
distribution of inventive activity between the United States and foreign
countries. The paper analyzes the eﬀect of U.S. tax changes, particularly
those introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, on the international
pattern of subsequent patenting by U.S. multinationals. Due to the spe-
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1. Griliches (1992) surveys the econometric evidence of economic spillovers from innova-
tive activity.
201ciﬁcs of U.S. tax law, U.S. ﬁrms diﬀer in the extent to which tax changes
aﬀect their after-tax costs of performing R&D in the United States. Firms
also diﬀer in the extent to which tax changes aﬀect the returns to using
the results of R&D performed in the United States to generate sales
abroad. The same U.S. tax changes do not directly inﬂuence the return to
R&D performed abroad by U.S. multinationals, so any induced interna-
tional relocation of innovative activity in the years following tax changes
reﬂect the ways in which domestic and foreign patenting activity are re-
lated.
There is extensive interest in understanding the role that MNCs play in
transferring technologies across borders. There are two methods by which
MNCs provide technology to the countries in which they invest. The ﬁrst
method is to develop new technologies locally, through R&D or other sim-
ilar types of activity. The second method is to import technologies pro-
duced elsewhere.
The foreign aﬃliates of U.S. ﬁrms use both methods to bring technolo-
gies to the countries in which they invest, and there exists suﬃcient infor-
mation to assess quantitatively the relative signiﬁcance of each method.
Direct information on the R&D activities of the foreign aﬃliates of U.S.
ﬁrms is reported in surveys conducted by the U.S. Department of Com-
merce. Information on technology imports by these aﬃliates is consider-
ably sketchier. One can, however, infer the approximate magnitude of tech-
nology imports from royalties paid by aﬃliates to U.S. parent ﬁrms and
third parties in other countries, because royalty payments should, in prin-
ciple, reﬂect the values of imported technologies.
Table 8.1 reports detailed information on the aggregate technology-
related behavior of the foreign aﬃliates of U.S. ﬁrms in 1982, 1989, and
1994. It is noteworthy that aﬃliates paid more in royalties to their parent
ﬁrms ($16.7 billion in 1994) than they spent on R&D ($11.9 billion in
1994), although, as the table indicates, there was extensive use of both
methods of technology acquisition. The survey distinguishes two catego-
ries of R&D expenditure: R&D by aﬃliates for themselves and R&D by
aﬃliates for others. R&D by aﬃliates for themselves constitutes roughly
80 percent of their total R&D expenditures.
In spite of extensive consideration in the literature of the role that
MNCs play in facilitating international technology transfer,2 there is very
little in the way of quantitative evidence of the complementarity or substi-
tutability of foreign and domestic technology. Hines (1995) oﬀers evidence
2. See, for example, Teece (1976), Mansﬁeld, Teece, and Romeo (1979), Mansﬁeld and
Romeo (1980), Davidson and McFetridge (1984), Lipsey, Blomstro ¨m, and Kravis (1990),
Zejan (1990), Blomstro ¨m (1991), Wang and Blomstro ¨m (1992), Blomstro ¨m and Kokko
(1995), and Ethier and Markusen (1996). These studies together consider the eﬀect of a large
number of variables on technology transfer and R&D activity, although they do not consider
the potential complementarity of domestic and foreign innovation.
202 James R. Hines Jr. and Adam B. Jaﬀethat domestic and foreign R&D are substitutes, but to the extent that ﬁrms
establish foreign R&D to exploit the core competencies that they have
developed at home by adapting the ﬁrms’ technologies to foreign markets,
we would expect that foreign and domestic R&D would be complemen-
tary. The evidence reported in Hines (1995) is based on an analysis of
aggregate data concerning the R&D activities of U.S. multinationals
abroad and the R&D activities of foreign investors in the United States.
The purpose of the current investigation is to examine whether similar
patterns appear at a ﬁrm level.
The empirical results in this paper suggest that foreign and domestic
innovative activities are complements rather than substitutes. Speciﬁcally,
ﬁrms with rising after-tax costs of performing R&D in the United States
that is directed at generating technology for use abroad are those that ex-
hibit the slowest growth of foreign patenting. This pattern is sensible if the
willingness to undertake foreign R&D is a function of the propensity to
perform related domestic R&D, and the latter is a function of domestic
tax incentives. What the results indicate is that domestic tax incentives can
signiﬁcantly inﬂuence not only the rate of domestic innovation, but also
the rate of foreign innovation by U.S. multinationals. Because complemen-
tarity is a symmetrical relationship, the results also imply that foreign tax
incentives should inﬂuence the rate at which U.S. multinationals innovate
in their domestic markets.
Evidence of the complementarity of innovative activity comes from an
Table 8.1 R&D and Royalty Activity of Foreign Aﬃliates of U.S. Multinationals
1982 1989 1994
R&D expenditures of aﬃliates
Total 3,851 7,922 11,877
By aﬃliate for itself 3,073 6,307 8,901
By aﬃliate for others 778 1,615 2,976
Royalty receipts of aﬃliates
Total 435 1,461 2,581
From U.S. parents 36 54 368
From other foreign aﬃliates 193 656 1,096
From unaﬃliated Americans 26 97 387
From unaﬃliated foreigners 180 654 730
Royalty payments by aﬃliates
Total 4,308 12,472 22,039
To U.S. parents 3,663 9,839 16,744
To other foreign aﬃliates 354 1,488 2,615
To unaﬃliated Americans 102 660 2,138
To unaﬃliated foreigners 189 485 543
Note: Amounts are in $ millions. Data cover majority-owned foreign aﬃliates of U.S. multi-
national ﬁrms.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1985, 1992, 1996).
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1992 period. There were several important U.S. tax changes over this time
period, notable among them the changes introduced by the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (TRA 1986). Using international patent data that specify the
inventor’s country of residence, it is possible to trace the eﬀect of U.S.
tax changes on subsequent patenting patterns, and thereby to identify any
eﬀects of U.S. tax changes on foreign innovative activity (as reﬂected by
patents).
Section 8.2 of the paper reviews the U.S. tax treatment of foreign source
income, with an emphasis on the tax treatment of R&D expenses and
foreign royalty receipts. Section 8.3 presents a model of ﬁrm behavior and
describes the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 8.4 presents the
regression results and analyzes their implications. Section 8.5 is the con-
clusion.
8.2 Tax Incentives
The United States taxes income on a residence basis, meaning that U.S.
corporations and individuals owe taxes to the U.S. government on all of
their worldwide incomes.3 The top U.S. corporate tax rate is now 35 per-
cent. Because proﬁts earned in foreign countries are usually taxed by host
governments, U.S. law permits taxpayers to claim tax credits for foreign
income taxes and related tax obligations, in order not to subject U.S. multi-
nationals to double taxation. The foreign tax-credit mechanism implies
that a U.S. corporation earning $100 in a foreign country with a 12 percent
tax rate (and a foreign tax obligation of $12) pays only $23 to the U.S.
government because its U.S. corporate tax liability of $35 (35 percent of
$100) is reduced to $23 by the foreign tax credit of $12. The foreign tax
credit is, however, limited to U.S. tax liability on foreign income; if, in the
example, the foreign tax rate were 50 percent, then the ﬁrm would pay $50
to the foreign government but its U.S. foreign tax credit would be limited
to $35. Thus, a U.S. ﬁrm receives full tax credits for its foreign taxes paid
only when it is in a deﬁcit credit position—that is, when its average foreign
tax rate is less than its tax rate on domestic operations. A ﬁrm has excess
credits if its available foreign tax credits exceed U.S. tax liability on its
foreign income. Firms average together their taxable incomes and taxes
paid in all of their foreign operations in calculating their foreign tax credits
and the foreign tax credit limit.4
3. Portions of this brief description of U.S. law are excerpted from Hines (1991, 1994,
1997).
4. In order to qualify for the foreign tax credit, ﬁrms must own at least 10 percent of a
foreign aﬃliate, and only those taxes that qualify as income taxes are creditable. Further-
more, income is broken into diﬀerent functional baskets in the calculation of applicable cred-
its and limits. Income earned and taxes paid in the conduct of most types of active foreign
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tant feature of the U.S. international tax system. A U.S. parent ﬁrm is
taxed on its subsidiaries’ foreign income only when that income is repatri-
ated to the parent corporation. This type of deferral is available only to
foreign operations that are separately incorporated in foreign countries
(subsidiaries of the parent) and not to consolidated (branch) operations.
The U.S. government taxes branch proﬁts as they are earned, just as it
would proﬁts earned within the United States.
The deferral of U.S. taxation may create incentives for ﬁrms with lightly
taxed foreign earnings to delay repatriating dividends from their foreign
subsidiaries.5 This incentive arises in those cases in which ﬁrms expect
never to repatriate their foreign earnings, or if they anticipate that future
years will be more attractive for repatriation (either because domestic tax
rates will be lower, or because future sources of foreign income will gen-
erate excess foreign tax credits that can be used to oﬀset U.S. tax liability
on the dividends).6 It appears that, in practice, U.S. multinationals choose
their dividend repatriations selectively, generally paying dividends out of
their more heavily taxed foreign earnings ﬁrst.7 Consequently, the average
tax rates that ﬁrms face on their foreign incomes need not exactly equal the
average foreign tax rates faced by their branches and subsidiaries abroad.
Branch earnings and dividends from subsidiaries represent only two
forms of foreign income for U.S. income tax purposes. Interest received
from foreign sources also represents foreign income, although foreign in-
terest receipts are often classiﬁed within their own “basket” and hence are
not averaged with other income in calculating the foreign tax credit. Roy-
alty income received from foreigners, including foreign aﬃliates of U.S.
ﬁrms, is also foreign source income. Foreign governments often impose
business operations are grouped in one basket; petroleum industry income is grouped in a
separate basket; and there are separate baskets for items such as passive income earned
abroad. The basket distinctions imply that a ﬁrm might simultaneously have excess foreign
tax credits in the petroleum basket (which is common because foreign tax rates on oil income
are typically quite high) and deﬁcit foreign tax credits in the active income basket. Such a
ﬁrm would have to pay some U.S. tax on its active foreign income, even though it has excess
foreign tax credits on its petroleum income.
5. The incentive to defer repatriation of lightly taxed subsidiary earnings is attenuated by
the subpart F provisions, introduced into U.S. law in 1962, that treat a subsidiary’s passive
income, and income invested in U.S. property, as if it were distributed to its U.S. owners,
thereby subjecting it to immediate U.S. taxation. The subpart F rules apply to controlled
foreign corporations (CFCs), which are foreign corporations owned at least 50 percent by
U.S. persons holding stakes of at least 10 percent each. CFCs that reinvest their foreign
earnings in active businesses can continue to defer their U.S. tax liability on those earnings.
See Hines and Rice (1994) and Scholes and Wolfson (1992) for the behavioral implications
of these rules.
6. It is interesting to note that the deferral of U.S. tax liability does not itself create an
incentive to delay paying dividends from foreign subsidiaries, because the U.S. tax must be
paid eventually. See Hartman (1985).
7. See the evidence presented in Hines and Hubbard (1990), Altshuler and Newlon (1993),
and Altshuler, Newlon, and Randolph (1995).
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aﬃliates to their U.S. parent companies; these withholding8 taxes are fully
creditable against an American taxpayer’s U.S. tax liability on foreign in-
come.
Royalties received by U.S. parent ﬁrms for R&D used abroad represent
taxable foreign source income of the U.S. ﬁrms. U.S. ﬁrms with deﬁcit
foreign tax credits must pay U.S. income tax on these royalty receipts,
whereas ﬁrms with excess foreign tax credits can apply the excess credits
against U.S. taxes due on the royalties, thereby eliminating the U.S. tax
liability created by the royalty receipts.
Most of the world’s governments impose withholding taxes on cross-
border royalty payments from aﬃliates located within their countries.
These royalty tax rates are frequently reduced according to the terms of
bilateral tax treaties. For example, the United States imposes a 30 percent
tax on royalties paid to foreign corporations, but this tax rate is often
reduced, in some cases to zero, when recipients of royalty payments are
located in countries with whom the United States has a tax treaty in force.
8.2.1 Interaction of R&D and Foreign Income Rules
U.S. ﬁrms with foreign income are generally not permitted to deduct all
of their R&D expenditures in the United States against their domestic
taxable incomes. Instead, the law provides for various methods of allocat-
ing R&D expenses between domestic and foreign income. The intention
of the law is to retain the relatively generous treatment of R&D, but only
for that part of a ﬁrm’s R&D expenditures that is devoted to production
for domestic markets. R&D-performing ﬁrms with foreign sales and for-
eign income are presumed to be doing at least some of their R&D to en-
hance their foreign proﬁtability.
From the standpoint of taxpaying ﬁrms, the U.S. tax law’s distinction
between domestic and foreign R&D deductions is potentially quite impor-
tant. If an R&D expense is deemed to be domestic, then it is deductible
against the taxpayer’s U.S. taxable income. Alternatively, if it is deemed to
be foreign, then the R&D expense reduces foreign taxable income for the
purposes of U.S. income taxation only. Foreign governments do not use
U.S. methods of calculating R&D deductions, and generally do not permit
U.S. ﬁrms to reduce their taxable incomes in foreign countries on the basis
of R&D undertaken in the United States. Consequently, an R&D expense
deduction allocated against foreign income is valuable to a U.S. ﬁrm only
8. Taxes on cross-border ﬂows, such as dividends, interest, and royalties, are known as
withholding taxes due to some of the niceties of their administration. Strictly speaking, these
taxes represent obligations of the recipients and not of the payors; this arrangement permits
immediate crediting of withholding taxes by recipients who are eligible to claim foreign tax
credits. The taxes are called withholding taxes because the local payor is the withholding
agent for the tax, and is therefore liable to ensure that the taxes are paid.
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the ﬁrm pays some U.S. tax on its foreign income, and any additional dol-
lar of R&D deduction allocated against foreign income reduces the ﬁrm’s
U.S. taxable income by a dollar. Hence, ﬁrms with deﬁcit foreign tax cred-
its are indiﬀerent between allocating R&D expenses against foreign in-
come and allocating them against domestic income.9 In contrast, ﬁrms
with excess foreign tax credits pay no U.S. tax on their foreign incomes,
and therefore have no use for R&D deductions allocated against foreign
income. Consequently, ﬁrms with excess foreign tax credits lose the value
of any R&D deductions allocated against foreign income.
The tax law governing the allocation of R&D expenses was for years
rather vague, but was codiﬁed by U.S. Treasury Regulation section 1.861-8
in 1977. The 1977 rules provide for several stages in allocating R&D ex-
penditures for tax purposes. R&D in the United States that is undertaken
to meet certain legal requirements (such as R&D devoted to meeting pol-
lution standards) can be 100 percent allocated against domestic income.
Firms that perform more than half of their (other-than-legally-required)
R&D in the United States are permitted to allocate 30 percent of that
R&D against U.S. income. The remaining 70 percent is then to be allo-
cated between domestic and foreign sources on the basis of sales (including
the sales of controlled foreign corporations [CFCs]). R&D is generally al-
located according to activities within product lines (deﬁned similarly to
two-digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation [SIC] codes), so that a corpo-
ration need not allocate part of its chemical R&D against foreign income
simply because the electronics part of its business has foreign sales.
Several options are available to taxpayers who are unsatisﬁed with the
outcome of the R&D allocation method just described. A ﬁrm is permit-
ted to apportion more than 30 percent of its domestic R&D against U.S.
income if it can establish that it is reasonable to expect the R&D so appor-
tioned to have very limited application outside the country; the remaining
portion of its R&D expenses are then allocated on the basis of sales. Alter-
natively, a ﬁrm is permitted to allocate its R&D on the basis of total for-
eign and domestic income (though without the 30 percent initial allocation
to U.S. source), so that a ﬁrm with foreign operations that generate sales
but not income (relative to domestic operations) might prefer the income
allocation method. There is, however, a limit to the income allocation
method: A ﬁrm is not permitted to reduce its foreign source R&D expense
allocation to less than 50 percent of the allocation that would have been
produced by the sales method (including the 30 percent initial appor-
tionment).
9. This statement, along with much of the subsequent analysis, abstracts from the ability
of ﬁrms to carry excess foreign tax credits backward two years and forward ﬁve years. Firms
that can exploit carryforwards or carrybacks may (depending on speciﬁc circumstances) face
intermediate incentives between those of deﬁcit credit and excess credit ﬁrms.
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ting U.S. ﬁrms to allocate 100 percent of the expense of R&D performed
in the United States against U.S. taxable income. This change was intended
to be temporary (lasting two years), in order to oﬀer strong R&D incen-
tives while aﬀording Congress the opportunity to rethink its R&D policy.
At the end of that time, the U.S. Department of the Treasury produced a
study (1983) concluding that the tax change oﬀered a small R&D incentive
to U.S. ﬁrms, and that it was desirable on that basis.10 In 1984 and 1985
Congress extended the temporary change permitting 100 percent deduct-
ibility of U.S. R&D expenses against U.S. income, so these rules remained
in place until the end of the 1986 tax year.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 removed the 100 percent deductibility of
U.S. R&D expenses, replacing it with a new (and again temporary) system
of R&D expense allocation.11 Under TRA 1986, 50 percent of U.S. R&D
expense (other than R&D to meet regulations, which was 100 percent allo-
cated to domestic source) was allocated to domestic source, with the re-
maining 50 percent allocated on the basis of sales or of income, at the
taxpayer’s choice. No limit was imposed on the degree to which allocation
on the basis of gross income could reduce foreign allocation relative to the
sales method. These rules, it turned out, were in eﬀect only for 1987.
The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 changed the
R&D expense allocation rules for the ﬁrst part of 1988. For the ﬁrst four
months of the year, ﬁrms were permitted to allocate 64 percent of U.S.
R&D expense against U.S. domestic income, with the remaining 36 per-
cent allocated between foreign and domestic sources on the basis of either
sales or income (at the taxpayer’s choice). The 1988 Act further provided
that if the 36 percent were allocated on the basis of income, then the R&D
allocation against foreign income must equal at least 30 percent of the
foreign allocation that would have been produced by the sales method.
For the remaining eight months of the year, taxpayers were required to
use the allocation method described in section 1.861-8 as of 1977 (and
described previously).
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 again changed the
R&D allocation rules, this time reintroducing the same rules that had ap-
plied for the ﬁrst four months of 1988. The Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1990 and the Tax Extension Act of 1991 extended this treat-
10. The U.S. Department of the Treasury study (1983) based its conclusions on a range of
assumed elasticities of R&D with respect to price changes; there was no attempt made to
ascertain how ﬁrms responded to the changes introduced in 1981.
11. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also introduced a number of other changes relevant to
R&D investment decisions, including reducing the statutory corporate tax rate from 46 per-
cent (the tax rate from 1979 to 1986) to 40 percent in 1987 and 34 percent for 1988 and
subsequent years. The 1986 Act also removed a number of investment incentives, such as
accelerated depreciation of capital assets and the investment tax credit for new equipment
purchases.
208 James R. Hines Jr. and Adam B. Jaﬀement of R&D expenses until a date that depends on a taxpayer’s choice of
ﬁscal year, but in no case later than 1 August 1992. Consequently, 64 per-
cent of domestically performed R&D in 1989–1992 could be allocated
against domestic income, with the remaining 36 percent allocated on the
basis of either sales or income (although use of the income method could
not reduce foreign source allocation to less than 30 percent of the foreign
source allocation that would have been produced by the sales method).
The expiration of the R&D expense allocation legislation in the summer
of 1992 motivated an extensive reconsideration of the issue of the appro-
priate tax treatment of R&D expenditures by MNCs. In June 1992, the
U.S. Department of the Treasury temporarily suspended its section 1.861-8
allocation rules (the 1977 regulations), replacing them with an eighteen-
month moratorium during which taxpayers could continue to use the sys-
tem embodied in the legislation covering the years 1989–1992 (64 percent
place-of-performance allocation, with the remaining deductions allocated
on the basis of sales). The idea was that the Treasury would reexamine its
section 1.861-8 regulations during the eighteen-month period. The ratio-
nale for the moratorium was “to provide taxpayers with transition relief
and to minimize audit controversy and facilitate business planning during
the conduct of the regulatory review.”12 Some contemporaneous observers
noted that the extension of the R&D allocation rules through Treasury
moratorium instead of Congressional legislation made the rules less costly
from the standpoint of federal budget targets, because regulatory changes
are exempt from the budget agreement limits. What role, if any, such con-
siderations played in the decision to suspend the section 1.861-8 rules is
not clear. In any case, the Treasury moratorium did not run its full course,
being supplanted in 1993 by new legislation.
President Clinton’s budget proposal of February 1993 recommended a
major change in the allocation of R&D expenditures and the treatment of
royalty receipts by U.S.-based MNCs. The president proposed that U.S.
ﬁrms deduct 100 percent of their U.S. R&D expenditures against U.S.
income, but that the same ﬁrms no longer be permitted to use foreign
tax credits generated by their active foreign operations to reduce U.S. tax
liabilities on royalty income from foreign sources. Instead, ﬁrms would
be required to allocate foreign source royalty income to the passive basket
in determining their foreign tax credit limits. The idea behind the change
was to limit severely the ability of U.S. ﬁrms to use excess foreign tax
credits to wipe out their U.S. tax liabilities on foreign source royalty in-
come. Very few ﬁrms have excess foreign tax credits in the passive basket.
Consequently, the overall eﬀect of the proposal would have been to raise
the deductions that ﬁrms with excess foreign tax credits receive for R&D
performed in the United States, but to include—as income fully taxed by
12. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation (1993, 55).
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gress chose not to include this proposal in the legislation passed in Au-
gust 1993.
Instead, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 93)
continued the pattern of allowing U.S.-based MNCs to deduct only a frac-
tion of their U.S. R&D expenses against U.S. income, and, at the same
time, permitted ﬁrms to use excess foreign tax credits to eliminate U.S. tax
liabilities on foreign source royalty income. OBRA 93 permitted ﬁrms to
allocate 50 percent of U.S.-based R&D expenses to domestic source, with
the remaining 50 percent allocated between domestic and foreign source,
based either on sales or on income, at the taxpayer’s option (subject to the
restriction that income-based allocation not reduce foreign source alloca-
tion to less than 30 percent of that produced by the sales method). The
allocation rules under OBRA 93 were temporary, expiring one year after
they took eﬀect. As in earlier years, many observers attributed the tempo-
rary nature of the allocation rules to the mechanics of compliance with
federal budget targets: If Congress were to pass permanent legislation cov-
ering the R&D allocation rules, then the cost, to the current-year budget,
of any treatment more generous than the 1977 regulations, must include
costs incurred in future years. By instead passing temporary legislation,
Congress incurs budgetary costs only for the current year. Of course, budg-
etary costs need not bear any relation to the economic consequences of
permanent legislation covering the allocation of R&D expenses.13
During 1995 the Treasury reconsidered the appropriateness of its 1977
R&D expense regulations. Based on newer analysis (U.S. Department of
the Treasury 1995), the regulations were amended roughly along the lines
of recent legislative developments. Speciﬁcally, the 1995 regulations permit
ﬁrms to select one of two allocation methods: one in which ﬁrms allocate
50 percent of U.S.-based R&D expenses to domestic source, with the re-
maining 50 percent allocated between domestic and foreign source based
on sales; and a second in which ﬁrms allocate 25 percent of U.S.-based
R&D expenses to domestic source, with the remaining 75 percent allo-
cated between domestic and foreign source based on gross income. Under
these regulations, income-based allocation is not permitted to reduce for-
eign source allocation to less than 50 percent of that produced by the sales
method. The new regulations amend the previous rules in certain, more
minor, ways as well.14 Owing to the expiration of the OBRA 93 R&D allo-
13. Some have strong feelings that permanent legislation creates a more predictable envi-
ronment for businesses, thereby making the United States a more attractive location for
R&D. Turro (1993, 436) quotes one tax practitioner, who describes Congress’s decision to
make the OBRA 93 R&D allocation rules temporary an “absurd tax policy decision.”
14. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms are required to make their elections permanent, so it is not possible
to use the sales method in one year and the income method in the next. In addition, the new
regulations specify that ﬁrms allocate R&D expenses based on three-digit SIC activities,
rather than the two-digit SIC activities provided in the previous regulations.
210 James R. Hines Jr. and Adam B. Jaﬀecation rules, the 1995 Treasury regulations now govern the allocation of
U.S. R&D expenses.15
8.3 Framework for Analysis
Changes in the U.S. tax treatment of R&D expenses aﬀect some ﬁrms
more than others, due to diﬀerences in excess foreign tax credit status and
in the extent to which sales and income have foreign sources. Conse-
quently, these changes can be used to identify diﬀerences between ﬁrms in
costs of performing R&D in the United States in years before and after
tax changes. The idea behind the empirical work that follows is to draw
appropriate inferences from correlations between tax-driven cost changes
and subsequent propensities to take out patents on the basis of U.S. and
foreign research activities.
8.3.1 A Model
It is useful to distinguish three types of R&D undertaken by MNCs.
The ﬁrst type is R&D performed in the United States and intended to
produce innovative output for the U.S. market. The second type is R&D
performed in the United States and intended to generate foreign sales. The
third type is R&D performed abroad. Tax incentives diﬀer for each of
these types, and as a result, the incentives that ﬁrms face to undertake
R&D in domestic and foreign locations will diﬀer. Of course, to a certain
degree these distinctions may be more pronounced ex post than they are
ex ante, because, in the early stages of industrial research, the location of
ultimate sales may be more than a little bit uncertain. For the purpose of
this analysis, ﬁrms are assumed to be able to distinguish the ultimate loca-
tion of the uses of their innovative output at the time that they perform
the initial R&D.
The R&D expense allocation rules imply that MNCs performing R&D
in the United States are unable to deduct all of their R&D expenses in
years after 1986. Instead, they can deduct a fraction  of such expenses,
in which the value of  depends on the ﬁrm’s foreign tax credit status, its
ratio of foreign to domestic sales, and the tax rules in place at the time.
U.S. tax rules in eﬀect between 1981 and 1986 imply that 1, whereas
those in eﬀect after 1986 imply that 1 0.
A U.S. ﬁrm that contemplates committing funds to an R&D project
that is expected to generate innovative output, and therefore sales in the
domestic market, maximizes
(1) , )(1 (1 ), i  
  
 ii i i QR R =− − − ()
15. It is noteworthy that the 1995 revisions to the R&D cost allocation regulations were
not costly from the standpoint of federal budget targets because regulatory changes are not
budgeted.
International Taxation and the Location of Inventive Activity 211in which i denotes ﬁrm i’s after-tax proﬁts, Ri is ﬁrm i’s expenditures on
R&D, Q() is net sales generated by ﬁrm i’s R&D activity, i is the fraction
of ﬁrm i’s R&D expenses that are deductible for tax purposes, and 
 is the
statutory tax rate. The variable i is an unobservable parameter (assumed
to be known to ﬁrms) that aﬀects the productivity of ﬁrm i’s research
activity and thereby inﬂuences its desired R&D spending. The function
Q() is assumed to be twice continuously diﬀerentiable and concave in R.
The ﬁrst-order condition corresponding to an interior maximum of (1) is



















Equation (2) expresses the simple point that reduced deductibility of do-
mestic R&D expenses, which is captured by lower values of i, are associ-
ated with higher required marginal products of R&D expenditures by
proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms. Because the function Q() is assumed to exhibit
decreasing returns to R, it follows that lower values of i reduce desired
spending on R&D.
The incentives facing a U.S. multinational performing R&D in the
United States for use abroad are potentially quite diﬀerent. Returns to
the innovating ﬁrm come in the form of foreign source royalties that are
eﬀectively untaxed by the United States if the ﬁrm has excess foreign tax
credits, and that are fully taxed otherwise. Denoting ﬁrm i’s R&D under-
taken for this purpose by R* i , and the relevant sales function by Q*(R* i ,
i),16 the ﬁrm’s proﬁts from this source (* i ) equal
(3)   
  
 ii i i i i QR R * *( *,) ( ) *() , =− − − 11
in which i reﬂects the extent to which ﬁrm i’s foreign source royalties are
taxed, so that i  0 for ﬁrms with excess foreign tax credits and i  1
for ﬁrms with deﬁcit foreign tax credits.
The ﬁrst-order condition corresponding to an interior maximum of (3)






















Equation (4) expresses in a simple way that the incentive to perform R&D
in the United States for use abroad is a function of the deductibility of
R&D expenses as well as of the tax treatment of foreign source royalty
16. Strictly speaking, it is necessary for the analysis that follows to include as an argument
of the Q*() function R&D undertaken by foreign aﬃliates; this argument is omitted, because
including it complicates the notation without changing the interpretation of the results.
212 James R. Hines Jr. and Adam B. Jaﬀereceipts. Assuming the Q*() function to exhibit decreasing returns to R*,
it follows that the desired level of R* is an increasing function of  and a
decreasing function of .
The third type of R&D that MNCs undertake is foreign R&D. The
foreign innovative activity of U.S. multinationals is a decreasing function
of R&D performed in the United States and intended for foreign use (R*)
if foreign and domestic research are substitutes, and an increasing function
of R* if they are complements.17 Because R* i is not directly observable, it
is necessary to infer its value from the tax incentives that ﬁrm i faces. This
inference is greatly complicated by the likely importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
technology shocks. Firms diﬀer greatly in their abilities and willingness to
patent new technologies, and these diﬀerences may change over time. It
is convenient to introduce the variable it, which denotes a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
shock to the patenting proclivity of ﬁrm i in period t. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc
shock it diﬀers from it, in that it aﬀects the marginal product of addi-
tional R&D spending, while it aﬀects the proclivity to obtain patents
conditional on research activity.
It is helpful to deﬁne foreign and domestic patenting functions:
(5a) PR it it
f
it *   *( , ), = 
(5b) PR it it it    (,) , = 
in which R f
it is the foreign R&D spending of ﬁrm i in year t, P* it is the
number of foreign patents taken out by ﬁrm i in year t,a n dPit is the cor-
responding number of domestic patents.18
From equation (4) it is clear that the after-tax cost of domestic R&D
directed at producing sales in foreign markets is a function of the ﬁrm’s
domestic tax situation. The extent, therefore, to which these domestic tax
considerations aﬀect R f
it (and thereby aﬀect P* it) depends on the comple-
mentarity or substitutability of foreign and domestic technology. The
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17. This discussion takes the returns to foreign R&D to be unaﬀected by domestic R&D
intended for the domestic market. This is a reasonable assumption, given the very limited
domestic use of technology produced by foreign aﬃliates, as reﬂected by royalty payments
reported in table 8.1.
18. It is noteworthy that this speciﬁcation assumes that any technology spillovers between
domestic and foreign innovation are fully credited to proper sources and therefore reﬂected
in royalty payments. The functional forms of equations (5a) and (5b) also require that patent-
ing be aﬀected only by R&D performed contemporaneously, a testable proposition examined
in the next section.
International Taxation and the Location of Inventive Activity 213in which the ﬁrst argument of the g* function is simply the after-tax cost of
performing R&D at home to generate sales abroad, and other considera-
tions,suchasﬁrmandeconomycharacteristicsinyeart,arecapturedbyit.
Combining equations (5a) and (6) yields a function that expresses for-
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By a similar reasoning, the demand for domestic R&D directed at produc-
ing sales in the domestic market is a function of the implied after-tax cost


































































in which the h() function expresses domestic patenting as a function of
the price of domestic R&D as well as ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks.
Linearizing the eﬀect of  and  yields
(10) Pf c it
it t
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in which c*a n dc are constants that reﬂect the impact of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
shocks on foreign and domestic patenting.
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214 James R. Hines Jr. and Adam B. JaﬀeEquation (12) expresses the change in foreign patenting as a function of
three variables: the change in home-country tax incentives for home R&D
directed at foreign markets, the change in tax incentives for home R&D
directed at domestic markets, and the change in domestic patenting. Esti-
mates of the propensity to develop foreign patents as a function of these
variables implicitly estimate the degree of complementarity or substitut-
ability of foreign and domestic R&D, because this connection is embedded
in the f*() function. It is this speciﬁcation that provides the framework
used in the empirical analysis.
8.3.2 Data
The empirical work that follows analyzes the behavior of publicly traded
ﬁrms whose annual report information is collected by Standard and Poors
Compustat Service. Starting from a universe of somewhat more than 7,500
companies, ﬁrms are included in the sample if they are multinationals in-
corporated in the United States, and if their reported foreign assets equal
1 percent or more of reported total assets for each year during 1986–1990.
This criterion is satisﬁed by 422 ﬁrms.
Foreign tax rate information is central to the analysis, because the hy-
pothesis that ﬁrms maximize after-tax proﬁts implies that deﬁcit foreign
tax credit ﬁrms will react very diﬀerently than excess foreign tax credit
ﬁrms to the changes introduced by TRA 1986. Compustat reports foreign
pretax incomes and foreign taxes paid by the ﬁrms in the sample, from
which it is possible to use simple division to obtain an estimate of eﬀective
foreign tax rates.19 These average foreign tax rates for ﬁrms in 1985 form
the basis of the tax calculations that follow. Data for 1985 are used because
this was the last full year before passage of TRA 1986, which introduced
incentives to relocate foreign operations and tax liabilities. Average foreign
tax rates are truncated at 0 and 100 percent for purposes of this con-
struction.
During the 1983–1986 period, U.S. tax law permitted U.S. ﬁrms to de-
duct 100 percent of their domestic R&D expenses against domestic tax-
able income. In the years after 1986, deductibility is based on excess for-
eign tax credit status and on shares of total sales in foreign markets. For
the purposes of constructing regression variables, it is assigned a value of
1 for all ﬁrms until 1986. In the period after 1986, ﬁrms are assigned it 
1 if the 1985 foreign average tax rate is below the (year t) U.S. statutory
tax rate; otherwise it  [1  0.36 (foreign sales fraction)], corresponding
19. Average foreign tax rates are used in place of actual foreign tax credit status (i.e., excess
or deﬁcit credit) for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that actual foreign tax status is endogenous to
a host of decision variables related to the ﬁnancing, investment, repatriation, transfer pricing,
and other activities of MNCs. Although average foreign tax rates are, by the same reasoning,
also endogenous, the endogeneity problem is generally regarded to be more severe with ex-
cess foreign tax credit status than it is with average foreign tax rates. The second reason is
that tax return data at the ﬁrm level are unavailable, so the actual foreign tax credit situations
of ﬁrms in the sample cannot be determined.
International Taxation and the Location of Inventive Activity 215to the expense allocation rules in place in 1991. Because the value of it
depends critically on foreign tax credit status about which only imprecise
information is available, a more continuous tax speciﬁcation is used in
deﬁning it: it is deﬁned to equal 1 minus the average foreign tax rate a
ﬁrm faced in 1985.
To determine the international distribution of patenting, the 422 sample
ﬁrms were matched to the database of U.S. patents created by NBER and
Case Western Reserve University.20 The NBER/CWRU database contains
all patents granted by the U.S. government between 1963 and 1996. This
database, based on the public patent records, identiﬁes for every patent
the inventors, the geographic location of the inventors, and a corporate
assignee (if any) to whom the patent right is transferred by the inventor.21
To use these data for the current purpose, it was necessary to identify all
U.S. patents that were taken out by the sample ﬁrms or their aﬃliates, as
well as the countries in which the patents originated.
The task of identifying the patents of the sample ﬁrms is complicated
by two problems. First, the patent oﬃce does not utilize an external code
or identiﬁer that permits patenting assignees to be linked electronically to
data such as provided by Compustat. Rather, assignees are indicated by
name, and the spelling and punctuation of the names are not completely
standardized—there may be patent records for “IBM” and others for
“I.B.M.” Secondly, and more fundamentally, companies choose the corpo-
rate entity to which the patent will be assigned, which could be a subsid-
iary or an aﬃliated company rather than the parent company. As described
further in Hall, Jaﬀe, and Trajtenberg (2000), the NBER/CWRU database
contains a match between the corporate assignees in the patent oﬃce data
and Compustat ﬁrms; the match attempts to deal with both of these prob-
lems. First, spelling and punctuation variations were standardized by re-
moving all spaces, punctuation, generic words (e.g., “Inc.” and “Co.”) and
searching for apparent multiple versions of the same entities based on
these compressed names. All potential matches of this sort were checked
by hand to ensure that they were real. Second, approximately 30,000 sub-
sidiaries and aﬃliates of the Compustat universe, as indicated in the 1998
Who Owns Whom Directory of Corporate Aﬃliations (Dun & Bradstreet
Ltd. 1989), were matched to the patent database to identify patents taken
o u tb yt h e s ea ﬃliates, and these aﬃliated patents were assigned to the
parent companies for the purpose of this paper.
20. For more information on this database, see the description in Hall, Jaﬀe, and Trajten-
berg (2000).
21. Patents must be taken out by the individual or individuals who created the invention.
About three-fourths of all patents are assigned, at the time of the patent application, to an
institution, typically the inventors’ employer.
The NBER/CWRU database contains additional information not used in this paper, in-
cluding a technological classiﬁcation of the patent and information about citations between
patents. See Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (1999) and Hall, Jaﬀe, and Trajtenberg (2000).
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ﬁrst inventor listed on the patent.22 The inventor locations in the patent
data are domestic residences (not citizenships or nationalities) of inventors
as indicated on patent applications. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that
a patent based on an invention from an IBM laboratory in Japan would
be coded as a “Japanese” patent. The patent might be assigned to IBM,
Inc., or it might be assigned to an aﬃliate or subsidiary organized in Ja-
pan. Either way, in principle, it would be treated as if it were an IBM
patent, so long as the Who Owns Whom directory includes the ownership
link. Certainly, it is possible for some subsidiaries and aﬃliates to be omit-
ted in this classiﬁcation, which would mean that the foreign patent counts
of their parent ﬁrms are systematically biased downward. Further, to the
extent that the creation of such foreign aﬃliates or the assignment of pat-
ents to them has changed over time, the change in foreign patents for these
ﬁrms might be systematically biased. There is no obvious reason, however,
that such an undercount of foreign patents would be correlated with the
other variables of interest.
For the purpose of estimation the data are combined to form two obser-
vations for each ﬁrm, one corresponding to the 1983–1986 period, and a
second corresponding to the 1988–1991 period. Foreign and domestic pat-
ents are summed over the four years that constitute each period. The speci-
ﬁcation of equation (12) that is then estimated is one in which the depen-
dent variable is the diﬀerence between the number of foreign patents taken
during the 1988–1991 period and the number taken during the 1983–1986
period. Similarly, the change-in-domestic-patents variable that appears on
the right side of equation (12) equals the diﬀerence between the number
of domestic patents taken during the 1988–1991 period and the number
taken during the 1983–1986 period.
Table 8.2 presents country-level information on foreign patents by ﬁrms
in the sample, along with other indicators of activity by the foreign aﬃli-
ates of U.S. multinationals. Foreign patenting is concentrated in a rela-
tively small number of technologically advanced countries, which is not
surprising; nor is it surprising that R&D spending by the foreign aﬃliates
of U.S. multinationals is concentrated in roughly the same countries. In-
deed, the ﬁve foreign countries (the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany,
Canada, and France) with the most patents attributed to resident inventors
over the period 1988–1991 lead all others in R&D spending by U.S. multi-
nationals in 1989. To be sure, there is important variation among coun-
tries, and most importantly, the vast majority of U.S. patents taken out by
sample ﬁrms have inventors that are residents of the United States. The
22. Jaﬀe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) investigated the extent of geographic disper-
sion among the inventors on a given patent. They found that all inventors on a given patent
listed the same country of residence on 98 percent of all patents (including those with a
single inventor).
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Patents Patents Net PPE Sales R&D
1983–1986 1988–1991 1989 1989 Spending 1989
Australia 14 17 12,113 37,745 191
Austria 2 1 919 5,550 16
Bahamas 0 1 616 1,529 *
Belgium 109 106 4,811 30,085 317
Brazil 4 6 9,223 30,588 90
Canada 152 305 63,636 173,251 914
Chile 1 1 718 1,981 1
Colombia 0 1 1,959 3,895 2
Denmark 3 10 923 4,119 d
Dominican Republic 0 0 281 578 *
Ecuador 1 0 196 578 *
Egypt 1 0 1,313 1,871 *
France 148 214 11,093 70,761 545
Germany 360 418 21,066 106,366 1,496
Greece 3 1 174 1,932 1
Guatemala 1 0 133 672 *
Hong Kong 4 7 3,174 16,408 9
India 1 10 76 323 2
Indonesia 1 0 4,644 6,120 2
Ireland 7 37 1,874 11,415 134
Israel 11 53 326 1,042 29
Italy 35 50 6,386 45,265 294
Japan 174 483 7,830 58,420 488
Luxembourg 26 21 633 1,443 d
Malaysia 3 10 2,212 5,419 3
Mexico 1 1 3,929 16,437 37
Netherlands 52 84 8,182 45,408 360
New Zealand 1 1 775 3,153 4
Nigeria 0 0 706 2,250 *
Norway 4 4 5,865 7,616 27
Philippines 2 2 531 2,905 5
Singapore 1 26 2,153 15,102 25
South Africa 2 4 449 2,653 9
South Korea 6 4 641 2,463 5
Spain 6 8 4,514 23,712 115
Sweden 13 12 732 7,703 33
Switzerland 93 88 1,977 36,231 67
Taiwan 0 4 1,047 6,773 23
United Kingdom 540 749 42,418 167,186 1,673
Venezuela 0 3 461 2,677 9
United States 28,516 39,143
Note: Columns (1) and (2) report total numbers of U.S. patents granted to the 378 U.S. ﬁrms in the
sample and assigned to inventors located in designated countries. Column (3) reports aggregate values
(in $ millions) of the local property, plant, and equipment of majority-owned nonbank aﬃliates of
nonbank U.S. parent ﬁrms in 1989. Column (4) reports aggregate sales (in $ millions) of majority-
owned nonbank aﬃliates of nonbank U.S. parent ﬁrms in 1989. Column (5) reports aggregate R&D
expenditures (in $ millions) on behalf of majority-owned nonbank aﬃliates of nonbank U.S. parent
ﬁrms in 1989. d  data suppressed to protect the identity of individual survey respondents. *  R&D
spending of less than $500,000. Data reported in columns (3)–(5) are drawn from U.S. Department of
Commerce (1992).foreign data presented in table 8.2, however, serve to conﬁrm the reason-
ableness of the patent attribution method on which is based the empirical
work that follows.
8.4 Results
As a prelude to estimating the model implied by equation (12), the re-
gressions reported in table 8.3 look simply at the ﬁrm-level relationship
between R&D and patents as it is evident in the data. Columns (1) and (2)
of table 8.3 present estimates in which the dependent variable is the log of
total (worldwide) ﬁrm patents over the 1982–1985 period, and the inde-
pendent variables include the log of R&D spending in 1986 and log of
total ﬁrm assets in 1986. The sample analyzed in these regressions is lim-
ited to ﬁrms with nonzero patents over 1982–1985, and those with positive
R&D spending and total assets in 1986.
Consistent with other work,23 the results indicate a strong correlation
between patenting and R&D activity, one that is not simply a function of
ﬁrm size (as measured by assets). The regression of log of patents on log
R&D (reported in column (1)) shows slightly less than constant returns of
patents to R&D, although this result is somewhat sensitive to how the
23. See, e.g., Bound, Cummins, Griliches, Hall, and Jaﬀe (1984).
Table 8.3 R&D Activity and Patenting Behavior
ln(total patents, ln(1  total patents,
1982–1985) 1982–1985)
Constant 0.8714 0.9037 1.0570 1.8438
(0.1478) (0.3452) (0.1797) (0.3429)
ln(R&D, 1986) 0.8376 0.4726 0.7317 0.5569
(0.0371) (0.0735) (0.0369) (0.0740)
Patents dummy 3.1103 3.0377
(0.2063) (0.2178)
ln(Assets, 1986) 0.4470 0.2151
(0.0787) (0.0857)
R2 .690 .728 .782 .788
N 231 231 292 292
Note: The table reports estimated coeﬃcients from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions.
The dependent variable in the regressions reported in columns (1) and (2) is the log of the
number of new patents (domestic plus foreign) taken out between 1982 and 1985. Observa-
tions are included in the samples analyzed in these regressions only if they have nonzero and
nonmissing patent and R&D data. The dependent variable in the regressions reported in
columns (3) and (4) is the log of 1 plus the number of new patents (domestic plus foreign)
taken out between 1982 and 1985. Observations are included in the samples analyzed in
these regressions only if they have nonzero and nonmissing R&D data. “ln(R&D, 1986)” is
the log of total R&D expenditures in 1986. “Patents dummy” is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if a ﬁrm took out nonzero patents between 1982 and 1985, and equals 0 otherwise.
“ln(Assets, 1986)” is the log of total ﬁrm assets in 1986. Heteroskedasticity-consistent stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.
International Taxation and the Location of Inventive Activity 219observations with no patents are treated. When log of total assets is added
to the regression, as it is in the regression reported in column (2), log assets
absorbs part of the explanatory power of log R&D, but the results continue
to imply a patent production function with approximately constant returns
to scale. Columns (3) and (4) of table 8.3 report regressions using a larger
sample of ﬁrms that includes those with no patents during the 1982–1985
period. The dependent variable in these regressions is now the log of 1
plus patents, and the right-hand side variables now include a dummy vari-
able that takes the value 1 if a ﬁrm has nonzero patents over this time
period. The results reported in columns (3) and (4) are qualitatively similar
to those reported in columns (1) and (2), in that a strong positive relation-
ship between patents and R&D spending exhibits decreasing returns.
The consistency of the ﬁrm-level patent data with country and ﬁrm
characteristics (as evidenced in tables 8.2 and 8.3) oﬀers the prospect of
informative estimation of variants of equation (12) using these data. Table
8.4 presents means and standard deviations of the regression variables,
and the initial regression results are presented in table 8.5. The speciﬁca-
tion estimated in these regressions is
























































Comparing equations (13) and (12), it follows that the regression coeﬃ-
cients can be interpreted as 1  (c*/c), 2 equals the product of (c*/c)a n d
a linearization of the f() function, and 3 captures a diﬀerent linearization
of the f*() function. The reason that the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the f() function
may be represented in equation (13) simply by it is that all ﬁrms were en-
titled to deduct their full R&D expenses in the period before 1986, and
all faced the same statutory taxes after 1986, so that this term diﬀers be-
tween ﬁrms only in it. The variable Xit represents ﬁrm-speciﬁc character-
istics (including a constant term).
Column (1) of table 8.5 reports estimates of equation (13) without in-
cluding ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics (other than constants). The estimated
coeﬃcients are consistent with the evidence reported in other tables and
with a generally complementary relationship between domestic and for-
eign innovative activity. The estimated value of 1 is approximately 0.06,
which means that shocks to domestic patenting translate rather little into
changes in foreign patents—reﬂecting the much larger share of U.S. inven-
tors than foreign inventors among the patents taken out by U.S. ﬁrms. The
estimated value of 2 is positive but not signiﬁcant, although this is not of
great consequence because it is included in equation (13) merely in order
to control for changes in domestic patenting due to tax changes rather
than ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks.
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Dependent Variable:
Change in Number of Foreign Patents
Constant 14.4802 11.9398
(7.4138) (7.3321)
Change in domestic patents 0.0590 0.0587
(0.0144) (0.0143)
R&D expense deductibility, 1991 13.5946 9.5607
(7.1326) (7.1384)
Change in R&D tax incentives 30.7697 26.4124
(foreign) (12.8296) (12.3228)




Note: The table reports estimated coeﬃcients from OLS regressions. The dependent variable
is the diﬀerence between the number of new foreign patents taken out during 1988–1991
(inclusive) and the number taken out during 1983–1986 (inclusive). “Change in domestic
patents” is the diﬀerence between the number of new domestic patents taken out during
1988–1991 (inclusive) and the number taken out during 1983–1986 (inclusive). “R&D ex-
pense deductibility, 1991” equals the fraction of domestic R&D expenses that ﬁrms can
deduct against their domestic tax liabilities in 1991. “Change in R&D tax incentives (for-
eign)” equals the change in the required cost of capital for a $1 investment in domestic R&D
intended to enhance foreign proﬁtability. “Percent foreign sales, 1991” equals the fraction
of a ﬁrm’s sales that are foreign in 1991. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are
in parentheses.
Table 8.4 Means and Standard Deviations of Regression Variables
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation N
R&D Sample (table 8.3)
ln(total patents, 1982–85) 3.5225 1.9805 231
ln(1  total patents, 1982–85) 3.5571 2.4662 292
ln(R&D, 1986) 2.8121 2.0368 292
Patents dummy 0.8219 0.3832 292
ln(Assets, 1986) 6.5559 1.8240 231
Foreign Patents Sample (tables 8.5 and 8.6)
Change in foreign patents 3.0317 14.8684 378
Change in domestic patents 35.2116 178.7609 378
R&D expense deductibility, 1991 0.8806 0.1315 378
Change in R&D tax incentives (foreign) 0.1126 0.0713 378
Percent foreign sales, 1991 0.3242 0.1946 378
First-period foreign patents 5.3810 21.1604 378
Foreign patents*R&D expense deductibility 4.6951 18.4840 378
Foreign patents*R&D incentives (foreign) 0.6773 2.8683 378
Note: The table presents means and standard deviations of variables used in the regressions.The negative and signiﬁcant estimated value of 3 implies that greater
deductibility of R&D expenses in 1991 is associated with increased foreign
patenting. Speciﬁcally, lower tax costs of performing R&D in the United
States for use abroad are associated with greater foreign patents in the
second (1988–1991) period relative to the ﬁrst (1983–1986). In order to
interpret the magnitude of the estimated value of 3, it is important to bear
in mind the construction of the R&D tax incentive variable, and speciﬁ-
cally, the use of average foreign tax rates in place of it.B e c a u s ea1 0
percent diﬀerence in average foreign tax rates is generally suﬃcient to
move ﬁrms between excess and deﬁcit foreign tax credit status, it follows
that the estimated value of 3 (without this correction) overstates by a
factor of ten the impact of changes in the tax treatment of royalties. The
estimated coeﬃcient of 30.8 in column (1) therefore implies that chang-
ing the domestic taxation of foreign source royalties from taxable to not
taxable, would, for a ﬁrm with the mean value of it  0.88, be responsible
for 1.1 additional foreign patents over the 1988–1991 period. Given the
sample mean value of 5.4 foreign patents over the 1983–1986 period, this
estimate implies that the cross elasticity of foreign patents with respect to
the after-tax cost of domestic R&D directed at foreign markets is between
0.2 and 0.4. This estimate is of the same order of magnitude, though of a
diﬀerent sign, as estimates of international R&D and royalty substitutabil-
ity reported by Hines (1995). These behavioral elasticities are considerably
smaller than an own-price R&D demand elasticity of unity or greater, as
reported by Hall (1993) and Hines (1993).
Column (2) of table 8.5 presents estimated coeﬃcients from a regression
that adds as an independent variable the 1991 ratio of foreign to total sales.
The purpose of this somewhat ad hoc addition is to control for a form of
unobserved heterogeneity, in which ﬁrms that diﬀer in their degrees of
multinationality also diﬀer in other unobserved dimensions that aﬀect
changes in foreign patenting. Firms with greater foreign sales in 1991 show
faster growth of foreign patenting, although in other ways the results pre-
sented in column (2) diﬀer little from those presented in column (1). The
estimated tax eﬀects in the column (2) regression are somewhat smaller
than those in the ﬁrst speciﬁcation of the equation, but remain signiﬁcant
and of the same sign.
Table 8.6 reports results from a diﬀerent speciﬁcation of equation (12):
(14) PP P P P P P
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The speciﬁcation in equation (14) is a close variant of equation (13), the
diﬀerence being that the independent variables are now interacted with
222 James R. Hines Jr. and Adam B. Jaﬀenumbers of foreign patents over 1983–1986. The speciﬁcation in equation
(14) is intended to provide a natural scaling for the price-type variables
that appear on the right side of equation (12).
The results reported in table 8.6 are quite consistent with those reported
in table 8.5. Firms with rapidly growing domestic patenting exhibit faster
than average growth of foreign patenting. Of particular interest is the esti-
mated 14.6 value of 3 in the regression reported in column (1). Again
taking a 10 percent change in the average foreign tax rate to be suﬃcient
to change foreign tax credit status, it follows that the 14.6 coeﬃcient
implies roughly a 0.5 cross-price elasticity of foreign R&D with respect to
the cost of domestic R&D directed at foreign markets. As is evident from
the results reported in columns (2) through (4) of table 8.6, minor speciﬁ-
cation changes aﬀect this estimated behavioral elasticity very little.
8.5 Conclusion
This study considers the eﬀect of changes in the after-tax cost of R&D
on subsequent patenting by U.S. ﬁrms in the United States and abroad.
Table 8.6 Foreign Patents and Domestic Tax Incentives
Dependent Variable:
Change in Number of Foreign Patents
Constant 0.4650 0.3125
(0.3300) (0.0094)
Change in domestic patents 0.0441 0.0443 0.0441 0.0441
(0.0094) (0.0093) (0.0094) (0.0094)
First-period foreign patents 7.0090 6.9122 6.9873 7.0120
(2.9126) (2.8834) (2.9001) (2.9079)
Foreign patents*R&D expense 6.1417 6.0594 6.1158 6.1389
deductibility (2.2333) (2.5081) (2.5218) (2.5281)
Foreign patents*R&D incentives 14.6054 14.4423 14.5892 14.6249
(foreign) (5.8364) (5.7862) (5.8173) (5.8309)
Percent foreign sales, 1991 2.4524 1.7459
(1.9554) (1.1536)
R2 .640 .654 .641 .656
N 378 378 378 378
Note: The table reports estimated coeﬃcients from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the
diﬀerence between the number of new foreign patents taken out during 1988–1991 (inclusive) and the
number taken out during 1983–1986 (inclusive). “Change in domestic patents” is the diﬀerence between
the number of new domestic patents taken out during 1988–1991 (inclusive) and the number taken out
during 1983–1986 (inclusive). “First-period foreign patents” is the number of foreign patents taken out
between 1983 and 1986. “Foreign patents*R&D expense deductibility” equals the product of foreign
patents taken out between 1983 and 1986 and the fraction of domestic R&D expenses that ﬁrms can
deduct against their domestic tax liabilities in 1991. “Foreign patents*R&D incentives (foreign)”
equals the product of foreign patents taken out between 1983 and 1986 and the change in the required
cost of capital for a $1 investment in domestic R&D intended to enhance foreign proﬁtability. “Percent
foreign sales, 1991” equals the fraction of a ﬁrm’s sales that are foreign in 1991. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
International Taxation and the Location of Inventive Activity 223The purpose is to estimate the impact of tax policy on the location of
successful inventive activity. Tax policy aﬀects patent location by inﬂuenc-
ing the location of R&D and therefore the likelihood of producing patent-
able inventions. Recent U.S. tax changes aﬀe c ts o m eU . S .ﬁ r m sm o r e
strongly than others, making it possible to estimate the eﬀect of tax poli-
cies on innovation by comparing reactions to the changes.
The results indicate that ﬁrms for which after-tax costs of performing
R&D in the United States for use abroad rose most rapidly after 1986
exhibited the slowest growth of foreign patenting in subsequent years. Esti-
mated cross-price elasticities of foreign patenting with respect to the cost
of domestic R&D directed at foreign markets vary between 0.2 and 0.5.
This suggests not only that tax incentives inﬂuence subsequent patenting
patterns, but that foreign and domestic innovative activities are comple-
ments at the ﬁrm level. Although this is an intuitively appealing ﬁnding, it
is inconsistent with available evidence of the international substitutability
of R&D activity as measured at the aggregate level. This raises the inter-
esting possibility that domestic and foreign innovation, although comple-
ments for individual ﬁrms, become substitutes between economies due to
induced eﬀects on the composition of industry or for other reasons.
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Comment Austan Goolsbee
In this paper, Hines and Jaﬀe take up the important issue of whether do-
mestic and foreign R&D are substitutes or complements. To do so, they
use an interesting but indirect test based on changes to the tax price of
doing R&D in the two locations. They show that R&D tax policy in the
1980s changed the relative incentive to engage in R&D domestically but
in a way that varied across companies depending on each one’s foreign tax
status. Using an extensive data source on foreign patents, they use this
cross-sectional variation to show that ﬁrms whose domestic tax prices rose
the most had the slowest growth rates of foreign patenting, and thus that
the two types of R&D must be complements.
The topic itself is quite important in ongoing discussions about tax and
R&D policy. R&D is subsidized or encouraged in most developed coun-
tries for the presumed spillovers. Often the country’s policy makers per-
ceive that their R&D eﬀorts are directly competing with the policies of the
other nations, but if there are strong complementarities, this will not be
the case.
First, let me discuss the precise experiment they analyze. The paper
begins with a ﬁrm investing in a foreign location and trying to decide
whether to do the R&D in the United States and then sell the product in
Austan Goolsbee is associate professor of economics at the University of Chicago Gradu-
ate School of Business and a faculty research fellow of the American Bar Foundation and
the National Bureau of Economic Research.
226 James R. Hines Jr. and Adam B. Jaﬀethe foreign country (and pay royalties back to the United States), or to do
the R&D and sell the product in the foreign country. Obviously the relative
tax treatment of R&D in the two countries will matter for the decision and
we know that the tax treatment varied substantially (perhaps too much!)
throughout the 1980s.
Normally, in a case like this, the researcher has only a time series on tax
policy and it is diﬃcult to identify the impact of taxes from other time
series variables. Hines and Jaﬀe make the important observation that the
changes to tax policy also generate cross-sectional variation in the relative
R&D price.
Oversimplifying somewhat, before the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA
1986), companies could deduct all of their U.S. R&D expenses from their
U.S. income. After 1986, they could deduct only part of it from U.S. in-
come because the rest was viewed to be intended for foreign markets.
Other countries, however, do not give these companies any credit for this
U.S. R&D, so the impact of this change varies by foreign tax status. For
ﬁrms with deﬁcit credits (also known as excess limits), whose foreign tax
rates are lower than the U.S. rate, this is not a problem. Firms with excess
credits, however, whose foreign tax rates are higher than the U.S. rate, lose
the deductions because they have already “maxed out,” if you will. Hines
and Jaﬀe argue, therefore, that changes to the allocation rules pre- and
post-TRA 1986 should impact the R&D of excess credit companies
diﬀerently than they would deﬁcit credit companies. Assuming that unob-
servable factors aﬀect both of these types of companies equally, it is pos-
sible to identify the impact of taxes based on the change in the cross-
sectional R&D price.
Because no data on the domestic and foreign R&D by ﬁrm are readily
available to examine this issue, Hines and Jaﬀe turn to the extremely de-
tailed NBER/Case Western Reserve University (CWRU) database on for-
eign patents of U.S. companies described in Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (1999).
This data is an exciting resource for economists and it is good to see it
ﬁltering into public economics and tax work. Essentially they can get a
measure of the foreign tax rate from Standard and Poors Compustat Ser-
vice and, classifying patents as a proxy for foreign R&D, look at the natu-
ral experiment just described.
The results show that there must be very substantial complementarity
between domestic and foreign R&D. As this is an indirect test based on a
natural experiment methodology, it is important to consider the plausibil-
ity of the magnitudes and the validity of the experiment before being fully
convinced by this type of evidence.
The ﬁrst quibble I have with the paper is that I do not think that the
coeﬃcients are estimated as precisely as the tables portray. There are two
time periods in the study (a before and after), and 378 ﬁrms; but the 378
ﬁrms are unlikely to be completely independent of one another. In the
International Taxation and the Location of Inventive Activity 227extreme, one might argue that the identiﬁcation comes strictly from com-
paring two types of ﬁrms—deﬁcit and excess credit. Accounting for the
dependence of the residuals across ﬁrms within tax status classes would
make the standard errors larger, possibly a great deal larger.
My second reservation about the results relates to their magnitude. The
paper notes that the results in table 8.4 suggest that for the average ﬁrm,
moving from taxable to nontaxable would result in eleven additional for-
eign patents from 1988 to 1991. Note, however, that the mean number of
foreign patents is only 5.4—so this is more than a 100 percent increase.
The means in table 8.2 do not make it easy to calculate an elasticity, but
my back-of-the-envelope computation suggests an elasticity of around 2.
Remember, this is not a standard own-price elasticity. It is more like a
cross-price elasticity, and as such is very large, indeed. Hines (1993) found
that the own-price elasticity of domestic R&D in this same context was
between 1.2 and 1.8. This very strong complementarity result is even
more puzzling when we consider the ﬁndings of Hines (1995), using aggre-
gate data, that foreign and domestic R&D are substitutes.
Further, the magnitude is probably biased toward zero by the role of
measurement error and policy uncertainty. As Hines and Jaﬀe painstak-
ingly recount the myriad changes to the international R&D incentives over
the time period, one cannot help but notice how frequently the major
changes take place. In the empirical work, they divide the sample into two
parts: 1983–1986 and 1988–1991. This type of grouping is probably the
right thing to do given the numerous changes, but it should introduce sig-
niﬁcant measurement error. It is hard to imagine any ﬁrm taking existing,
statutory tax policy as being permanent, and this expectations problems
is likely to bias the results downward.
Regardless, given the natural experiment methodology, it is not unusual
to ask whether this is a valid experiment and whether there is a valid con-
trol group. The basis of the paper is a comparison of the patent responses
of excess and deﬁcit credit ﬁrms in the two periods. One may not be a
valid control group for the other, however, even when eliminating aggre-
gate factors. It would take some more convincing to establish the validity.
By deﬁnition, the two groups must be investing in diﬀerent countries,
for example. It would be helpful to know whether low-tax countries (which
are, on average, the investment locations of deﬁcit credit ﬁrms) are concen-
trated in certain geographic regions, and so on. Over the 1980s, there were
some major economic shifts that were not neutral across regions, that
might inﬂuence patenting probabilities, and that are probably correlated
with the tax changes. Things like the tremendous fall of oil prices or the
dramatic shifts in exchange rates around the same time as TRA 1986 are
likely to have impacted companies diﬀerently if they had invested in Asia
versus Europe versus the Middle East, for example; and, as omitted vari-
ables correlated with the tax change, could generate the tax results. In the
228 James R. Hines Jr. and Adam B. Jaﬀeyears after TRA 1986, there were also some substantial tax changes in
other countries that may have similarly inﬂuenced incentives. Each of
these issues deserves more discussion to assure us that the estimated im-
pact is not spurious.
To summarize, in this paper, Hines and Jaﬀe present a creative approach
to establishing the complementarity of foreign and domestic R&D and the
results are striking but not conclusive. It is, perhaps, unrealistic to expect
that we would ﬁnd the results completely deﬁnitive because they are based
on indirect evidence and one can always quibble with the data or the exper-
iment in such studies. I hope that their eﬀort, however, will encourage
others to use tax policy as the source of experiments that can illuminate
important areas of research on R&D.
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